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Educating the Legal Imagination 
 






This paper presents a basic model of the imagination and then offers pedagogical 
resources and activities for educating three related abilities to imagine. The basic model 
is that to imagine is to combine two processes: 1) having been made aware of an artefact, 
we enter into a distinct epistemic frame, where we take epistemic distance and suspend 
certain epistemic norms and commitments; and 2) we simultaneously actively 
participate, by doing things with and thanks to artefacts. Artefacts, in turn, are fabricated 
forms (here, forms of language) that signal their own artifice and invite us to do things 
with them, across a spectrum of sensory, kinetic, and affective abilities. Modelled in this 
way, imagination plays a crucial role in legal reasoning, and is exemplified by the 
following kinds of artefacts in legal discourse: fictions, metaphors, hypothetical scenarios 
and figuration. These artefacts and their related processes of imagination are vital to legal 
reasoning at many levels, including the level of the individual lawyer or judge, the level of 
interaction in courtrooms, and the level of legal language over time. After sketching the 
basic model, the paper offers nine learning activities corresponding to educating three 
abilities in the legal context: 1) the general ability to take epistemic distance and 
participate; 2) the ability to generate alternatives and possibilities; and 3) the ability to 
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In 1874, the Spanish painter, Pere Borrell del Caso (1835-1910), known for his 
trompe l’oeil paintings, painted what is often said to be his most famous work, 
‘Escaping Criticism’. The painting depicts a young boy poised on the edge of a 
frame, creating the illusion of a painted figure coming alive – one about to leave 
the world of art and enter that of life (hence, I suppose, ‘Escaping Criticism’). I call 
upon this painting here as an icon of active learning, and as an allegory of the role 
of imagination. On the one hand, the boy’s body is vigorous and full of energy, and 
his eyes are open and full of wonder and surprise – as if he can’t wait to jump out 
of the frame and explore. On the other hand, he has not quite left the frame – 
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indeed, he holds onto it with both hands, indicating tentativeness, uncertainty, 
perhaps some anxiety, or at least some doubt. Conceived of as an active learner, 
the boy depicts an energetic but careful curiosity, something purposefully 
tentative, cautiously exploratory – a vigorous doubt, a poised inquisitiveness. 
Understood as an allegory of imagination, the boy is both inside and outside, both 
on-line and off-line, in a liminal state, and engaged in a dual mental process that 
involves both being aware of artifice (being off-line) and still participating (being 
on-line) – a kind of immersive reflexivity, an enchanted rationality, which I shall 
suggest is key to the imagination.   
 In what follows, I take my cue from this painting in order to 1) propose a 
model of the role and value of the imagination in legal reasoning; and 2) discuss 
the associated abilities to imagine and provide some ideas and resources for how 
we might educate those abilities in the legal context. The focus of the paper is on 
education, and so I will only sketch the model (in section 1), and then go on in 
three further sections (2-4) to discuss the following three abilities: a) the ability 
to take epistemic distance and participate; b) the ability to generate alternatives 
and possibilities; and c) the ability to construct mental imagery. In so doing, I will 
be drawing upon some more or less recent teaching experiences, some from my 
own classes (mainly in Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, a final year compulsory 
course in the undergraduate law degree at Queen Mary University of London), and 
some which I have developed with a visual artist and Shakespeare actress in a past 
project (see Del Mar 2016).  
 
 
1. Artefacts and the Imagination in Legal Reasoning 
 
We imagine in many different ways and in many different contexts. No one model 
of the imagination can hope to capture all these differences, and nor should it. To 
imagine, on the model I here can merely sketch, is to combine two processes (this 
duality being crucial): first, having been made aware of an artefact, we enter into 
a distinct epistemic frame, where we take epistemic distance and suspend certain 
epistemic commitments and norms; and second, we simultaneously actively 
participate – we do things with and thanks to these artefacts. This model requires 
quite some unpacking, which, once again, I can only do cursorily. 
The first term here that requires unpacking is ‘artefact’. By an artefact I 
mean a fabricated form that: first, captures our attention by signalling its own 
artifice; and second, calls on us to do something with it. The ‘fabricated form’ I 
focus on here is written language, but forms can also include visual marks, 
gestures or sounds.1 These artefacts can vary in two principal ways: first, they 
capture our attention, signalling their own artifice, in different ways; and second, 
they call on us to do different things with them, appealing to a range of affective, 
sensory and kinetic abilities.  
                                                        
1 This implies that language is not the only resource available to legal reasoning – e.g. legal 
practice is also guided by, and could find resources within, visual forms. Thus, legal 
education ought to include the development of critical visual literacy in lawyers. The 
teaching of visual rhetoric in law schools has been strongly advocated by Richard Sherwin 
(e.g. 2011) in recent years, and it would be great to see more discussion of visual legal 
epistemology and visual legal education in the future.  
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This is all very abstract, so let me give some examples. Forms can signal 
their own artifice quite explicitly, as when we say ‘Let us suppose X’, or ‘Let us 
treat X as if it is Y’; or when we introduce a subjunctive mood, with e.g. ‘perhaps’ 
or ‘maybe’. But forms can also implicitly signal their own artifice, e.g. by appearing 
overtly stylised or patterned (as in alliteration), or through authorial self-
undermining (e.g. contextual evidence of the unreliability of a narrator). The 
general point is that in signalling their own artifice in these different ways, forms 
(in this case, forms of language) put us on epistemic notice or alert. As they do so, 
artefacts appeal to our emotions of wonder, surprise and perhaps also the 
pleasure of reflexivity.  
These artefacts differ not only in how they signal their own artifice, but also 
in how they invite us to do different things with them. For example, an artefact 
might set up a semantic clash (as in metaphor) and invite us to resolve that clash 
(by relating the two images in a metaphor with each other). Or an artefact might 
be under-specified in some way – for instance, through the use of blanks or ellipsis 
(…) – and thus invite us to complete something (to fill in the blanks). Or, an artefact 
may present itself as having double or excess meaning (as in allegory or irony), 
and thus invite us to go elsewhere, or peak behind the veil of the words. In general, 
by presenting themselves as incomplete, underspecified, excessively meaningful, 
incongruous, or dislocated, artefacts – in this case, forms of language – call upon 
us to do something with them. In doing something with them, it would be 
inaccurate to say that we are using them, as we might use a tool or instrument. 
The kind of invitation issued to us by artefacts calls for something else – a mode 
of mindful participation, a travelling alongside, a process in which we are neither 
entirely passive nor entirely active (and thus neither entirely in control or entirely 
groundless).  
This process that artefacts invite us into is the process of imagination. Just 
as there is variability in the kinds of artefacts there are and what they invite us to 
do, so there is variability in how we exercise the imagination. As related to the 
above model, we can: first, take epistemic distance in different ways, suspending 
different kinds of epistemic commitments and norms; and second, we can 
participate in different ways, doing so along a spectrum of affective, sensory and 
kinetic involvement. Let me, again, give some examples.   
 There is a rich variety of epistemic acts and attitudes via which we can take 
epistemic distance. They have subtle differences, and a fuller study of these would 
demonstrate the distinct epistemic atmosphere of each. They include, for instance, 
supposing something is so, considering or conceiving something to be in a certain 
way, entertaining some thought, and pretending. Each of these can itself be 
exercised variably – we can pretend to be someone or something else, or we can 
pretend to treat someone or something as someone or something else, and so on. 
These epistemic acts and attitudes come in different degrees of epistemic distance 
– and involve different ways of bracketing or quarantining what we believe or 
know. Notice that this way of modelling imagination does not reduce it to 
‘suspension of disbelief’ – such an epistemic act is but one of many possible ways 
of taking epistemic distance, and indeed is a particularly strong one. It is common 
to take more subtle, more tentative, more cautious epistemic distance, retaining 
some epistemic standards (e.g. coherence amongst elements) while suspending 
others (e.g. correspondence between words and things).  
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 In addition to taking epistemic distance in different ways, we also 
simultaneously participate – and we do so in different ways. It is crucial to see that 
to imagine is not just to go off-line (precisely to take epistemic distance), but 
instead to be off-line and on-line at the same time. Recall again the boy in the 
painting: he is both in and out of the frame, in a liminal state. That is also the state 
of the imagination – a dynamic process, which combines yielding to something, 
and yet doing something active, participating. We can participate in different 
ways, e.g. we can merely suppose, exercising little mental imagery, kinetic 
simulation or affective involvement (for instance, when we suppose that there 
exist only prime numbers). Or, we can participate in ways that involve much more 
mental imagery, kinetic simulation and affective involvement – as when I, say, see 
a volume of Hans Christian Anderson tales in a bookshop and imagine the face of 
my mother reading them to me, or when I enact something (I pretend to be a 
monster and chase my five-year old around the house).  
 Modelled in this way, the imagination is not some extraordinary ability, 
exercised only by artists and geniuses, or something that involves a purely or 
predominantly mental and unconstrained flight from reality (as in a daydream or 
fantasy). Quite the contrary, understood in this way, imagination is something we 
exercise often, which we can and do in the company of others and indeed 
interactively with them (as in games of pretence), and which is connected (in 
varying degrees) with our emotions and our bodies. The imagination understood 
this way should also not to be confused with creativity – some exercises of the 
imagination may be creative (i.e. may involve the generation of something novel 
or some unusual mixture of previously recognised elements), but they need not 
necessarily.2  
 If we understand imagination in this way, we can see that it plays a vital 
and important role in legal reasoning. When a judge is inquiring into what may be 
normatively relevant in this case and in potential cases of this kind in the future, 
and thus searching for what may be the relevant values or interests at stake, such 
a judge will often exercise the imagination. Indeed, the chances are that such a 
judge will already have been invited to do so – either by counsel in the case, or in 
reading material proposed as relevant (e.g. past cases). For instance, a judge may 
entertain a hypothetical scenario – an artefact, which signals its own artifice (e.g. 
by being a caricature or hyperbole, in its exaggerated facts), and in being under-
specified (short, pithy), invites the judge to construct mental imagery and react 
emotionally to the facts in the hypothetical. In so participating (experiencing the 
hypothetical scenario visually and emotionally), the judge may explore what 
values and interests may be at stake in the case before her.3 Similarly so with a 
metaphor (of which the law is full): in entertaining the relation between two 
images proposed in a metaphor (e.g. that the constitution is a living tree), and thus 
in attempting to resolve a semantic conflict between these images, a judge enters 
into a distinct epistemic frame where she suspends referentiality, and searches for 
ways in which such a relation may make sense. In that process – in this case, of 
metaphorical cognition – a judge may consider what aspects of a tree might help 
                                                        
2 For some more takes on this ordinary and constrained conception of the imagination, 
see Kind and Klug (2016).  
3  For more on experiencing and reasoning with hypothetical scenarios, see Del Mar 
(2018).  
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in exploring what methodological approach to take to constitutional 
interpretation (e.g. to emphasise the leaves and their changing colours in the 
seasons, which may lead to more progressive interpretation, or the more sturdy 
and robust roots, which may lead to more conservative interpretation).4 Or, to 
give one more example, in inquiring into the reasonableness of an accused or 
defendant’s actions, a judge may simulate a mental film of a Reasonable Person – 
this being a figure similar but not identical to the accused or defendant, acting in 
similar but not identical circumstances of the case. In engaging in this practice of 
figuration, a judge can explore what features of the actual defendant, and the 
actual facts, are important in deciding what is reasonable.  
 These processes of the imagination are valuable at three different levels: 
the individual; the interaction between individuals; and the resourcefulness of 
legal language over time. At the level of the individual (for instance, a lawyer or 
judge), these processes are crucial, for they both stimulate and make possible 
normative judgement by connecting it to our affective and kinetic abilities. 
Further, these processes, enabled by such artefacts (as metaphors, hypothetical 
scenarios, figuration – and there are more), create time and space for thought; 
they help deliberating agents hesitate; they provide them with shelters for inquiry, 
and thus allow for non-committal experimentation and the generation of 
alternatives and possibilities. They are also – and this is important – fun and 
pleasurable to engage in.5 
 Imagination is also valuable at the level of interaction between persons (in 
real time, typically in a court room), and over time as when artefacts appear in the 
texts of judgements or other legally-relevant materials. At the level of interaction, 
these artefacts – whether they be metaphors, scenarios, figurations, or others – 
feature in live interaction between judges and advocates, and sometimes as 
between the judges. The persons in such scenes of interaction entertain a 
metaphor together, share possible variations of facts in hypothetical scenarios, 
and examine the possible actions of a Reasonable Person interactively. Artefacts, 
then, and related processes of imagination, can often spark non-confrontational, 
indirect conversation, enable joint attention, involve humour (which has 
important cognitive and political advantages), and allow participants to share or 
compare emotional and kinetic experiences. Further, at the level of legal language 
                                                        
4 The literature on metaphor in legal reasoning is vast. A recent collection, with relevant 
references, is Hanne and Weisberg (2017). See also Del Mar (2017A).  
5 The model of the imagination that I have in mind here (which one might, if pressed, call 
‘deliberative’) ought to be distinguished from what one may call ‘the perspectival 
imagination’, as when judges attempt to imagine what some experience was like or might 
be like for a certain person. Such perspectival exercises of the imagination are in fact of 
often painful (for the experiences in question themselves are often painful), and they are 
also difficult. Despite the difficulties involved, I have elsewhere argued (see Del Mar 
(2017B)) that it is often important that judges try to overcome imaginative resistance – 
here, the role of emotion is important. If this is correct, then this also has implications for 
legal education – students need to develop the ability to exercise the perspectival 
imagination. The ‘perspectival imagination’ has also sometimes be characterised as the 
‘moral imagination’, and reference here is often made to related abilities such as empathy 
and sympathy. Martha Nussbaum has been a leading voice in this respect, also in terms of 
educating the moral imagination (see e.g. Nussbaum (1995)); and see also Sarat, Frank 
and Anderson (2011); and Bankowski and Del Mar (2013).   
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existing over time, artefacts enable inquiry across time, allowing agents at a later 
time to pick up where the last conversation left off, and to e.g. re-examine a 
metaphor, or introduce a new variation into a hypothetical scenario. Such 
artefacts keep legal language alive, not allowing it to become too automatic, too 
ready-to-hand (precisely because it invites us to be active, to do things with it). 
Such language also affords collective memory, and perhaps also collective 
modesty, for it reminds us of the further work (of the imagination) that the law 
requires.  
 Necessarily, the above is a sketch of a model – of the imagination, and its 
role and value in legal reasoning.6 What I turn to now are three related abilities 
(to imagine), and how we might be able to encourage our students to exercise 
them in the legal context.  
 
 
2. Ability I: Taking Epistemic Distance and Participating 
 
Although I have stressed that the imagination is something we exercise relatively 
often, both in our daily life and in specialised contexts (like the law), it is also 
important to see that we need to learn to imagine, and that we can be better or 
worse at it. In what follows, I present three such abilities: 1) taking epistemic 
distance and participating; 2) generating alternatives and possibilities; and 3) 
constructing mental imagery.  
 The first ability is the most emblematic of the model of the imagination, as 
I have sketched it above. One might think of it as the general ability to imagine. 
The first point to make about it is that it is an ability that we need to acquire – we 
are not born with it, and indeed some persons have trouble acquiring it. Stanley 
Cavell offered some entertaining examples of this in his The Claim of Reason 
(1979): 
  
A soldier being instructed in guard duty is asked: ‘Suppose that while 
you’re on duty in the idle of a desert you see a battleship approaching your 
post. What would you do?’ The soldier replies: ‘I’d take my torpedo and 
sink it.’ The instructor is, we are to imagine, perplexed: ‘Where would you 
get the torpedo?’ And he is answered: ‘The same place you got the 
battleship.’ (Cavell 1979, p. 151) 
 
The point – in this ‘old gag about supposition’ (ibid.) – is that not all of us come to 
acquire the ability to take epistemic distance and participate, including developing 
responsiveness to cues of artifice. The soldier plays, but not quite in the manner 
desired by the instructor – the soldier, we might say, does not play along; he is not 
responsive to taking epistemic distance (in this case, to suspend the norm of 
likelihood or probability – given how improbable it is a battleship will appear in 
                                                        
6 For reasons of space, I have ignored here previous efforts by legal scholars who have 
drawn on the concept of the imagination and advocated for its education in law schools – 
perhaps most obviously, through the work and legacy of James Boyd White (see his classic 
(1973), now reissued in 2018; and see Etxabe and Watt (2014)). I have sought to add, 
however modestly, to these important efforts by offering a more explicit model of the 
imagination, and by identifying particular abilities to imagine that we can develop in law 
schools.    
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the middle of a desert), and to participating (to going along with it, and 
considering his response in the imaginary scenario). Of course, one could also read 
the ‘gag’ as showing that the soldier understands perfectly well, and plays with the 
instructor (i.e. knowing that the instructor wants him to play along, the soldier 
pokes fun at the instructor’s methods). There is less ambiguity (though also less 
hilarity) in another of Cavell’s examples: 
 
I am teaching chess to someone, and after a game I say, ‘Supposing my king 
had been there, and your last pawn there, and the rest of the board was 
empty: what would you have done?’ If he says ‘I would not have moved the 
pawn’ that may show that he has or has not mastered a mode of endgame. 
But if he says ‘I would have fainted’ he is making a weak joke. And if he asks 
seriously: ‘How do you know there are no other pieces on the board?’ then 
that suggests he hasn’t mastered a mode of speech, a form of life, viz. 
imagining or supposing. (Cavell, 1979, p. 151) 
 
Put aside here the fudging of a distinction between imagining and supposing (I 
consider the latter to be a subset of the former), and put aside also the reference 
to ‘mastery’ (for I do not think we ever ‘master’ anything) – the principal point is 
that there is here a relevant ability one needs to acquire, and one which one might 
not, i.e. the ability to go along with an invitation to take epistemic distance and 
participate (in this case, to suggest a move in the game with the restrictions 
proposed by one’s teacher).  
 In his important and pioneering book, The Work of the Imagination (2000), 
Paul Harris provides a detailed account of when children develop the ability to ‘go 
along with a pretend stipulation (e.g. a red brick is cake, a yellow brick is a 
banana), and extend it over time’ (Harris 2000, p. 12-13). The answer is that some 
children as young as two can do this, and that, furthermore, they acquire and 
develop this ability in interactive contexts – indeed, pretence for children is a 
crucial form of interaction (or play), and one that ‘calls for considerable flexibility 
and sensitivity’ (Harris 2000, p. 29). Such pretend play – especially when it 
involves role-pretence, and not just object-pretence – ‘is much more flexible than 
a script-enactment theory would allow’, e.g. the child ‘enacts the way that the 
characters might respond to novel and unexpected events’ (Harris 2000, p. 35), 
where such enactment presumably must be responsive to cues (of pleasure or 
displeasure) from one’s interacting partners. As Harris points out, engagement in 
these kinds of activities – pretence being one way in which one might exercise the 
imagination – is crucial to the development not only of social skills, but also 
reasoning abilities as well as arguably moral abilities (e.g. adopting the 
perspective of another, seeing something from another’s perspective).  
 In developing his account, Harris is objecting to certain earlier accounts of 
the imagination, which worried that imagination was deleterious to the cognitive 
development of children, e.g. because children who engaged in it were at risk of 
losing themselves in flights of fancy or fantasy, sealing themselves off from reality. 
However, as Harris discussed, and as I have emphasised above, it is a mistake to 
think of imagination as necessarily a flight from reality – instead, the imagination 
involves a dual mental state, and one that is better conceptualised as a tentative 
exploration of reality, rather than a flight from it.  
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 Law students are, of course, not children. However, some may not have had 
much opportunity to acquire the ability to take epistemic distance and participate, 
and many will have lost much of the opportunities to continue to exercise this 
ability (given how little opportunities we have to play as we get older, at least in 
the educational setting). Even where students have acquired such an ability, and 
have had opportunity to keep exercising it, one can always improve it. The next 
question, then, is how: how might we give our students opportunities to exercise 
and develop this ability? In answering this question, let me first mention some 
general resources, and then propose some specific activities for the legal context.  
 One obvious resource for developing this ability is literature. In his 
marvellous book, How To Do Things with Fiction (2012), Joshua Landy resists the 
usual ways of arguing for the value of literature (e.g. that it assists in the 
development of empathy), and argues instead that we think of (some) fictions as 
‘formative’, i.e. as forms of language and narrative that allow us to ‘fine tune our 
mental capacities’ (Landy 2012, p. 10). Here are four examples he provides: 
 
- The parables of St Mark: reading the parables, and engaging in parabolic 
reasoning, helps – says Landy – train a mental capacity for reading one 
thing and thinking of another (see Landy 2012, ch. 2). It might be added 
here that parables (or at least some of them) are a particular sub-set of 
allegorical literature, and one which often surprise the reader by 
positioning the reader in the place of one of the characters in the parable – 
parables are, then, a highly self-reflexive form of allegory.  
 
- Plato’s Dialogues: these texts, often via the device of authorial irony (i.e. the 
way that the authority of Socrates is often undermined) help train us to 
distance ourselves from our beliefs, and adopt a critical stance to them (see 
Landy 2012, ch. 4). As Landy points out elsewhere, ‘Plato’s desire to leave 
critical space between himself and his purported mouthpiece [Socrates] is 
routinely covered up, denied, or simply not imagined as a possibility’ 
(Landy 2007, p. 93). This is so, for instance, in The Symposium or in Gorgias 
– in both, therefore, it is ‘not sufficient to understand what is being said’ 
(ibid., p. 96); one must participate more actively, precisely in a form of 
double-reading – for what is said and for how what is said is undermined 
by the narrative and other linguistic features.7  
 
- Proust’s In Search of Lost of Time: Proust’s ‘convoluted sentences’, says 
Landy, ‘stretch the mind’s capacity for keeping multiple hypotheses in play, 
while imposing provisional order on a rich set of material’ (Landy 2012, p. 
18). The linguistic and grammatical features of Proust’s sentences is clearly 
crucial here, but it may be that other genres of fiction (without such 
‘convoluted sentences’) can also assist in similar (though not identical), 
training, e.g. detective fiction.  
 
                                                        
7 See also Schur (2014), who points out that when we really engage with Plato’s texts, we 
are never quite sure what to believe, or what opinion is really held by Socrates. Plato, 
then, plays with the fragility of belief – or, better, gives us an opportunity to experience 
that fragility.   
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- Austen’s Pride and Prejudice: According to Landy, Austen invites us, thanks 
to that novel’s ‘liberal use of free indirect discourse, to practice stepping 
back from our sometimes overhasty judgments’, and this is because ‘Free 
indirect discourse always situates us half inside a belief and half outside it’ 
(Landy 2012, p. 18).  
 
In all these cases, whether it be reading figuratively, or appreciating irony, or 
exercising provisionality and holding multiple hypotheses in mind, or relating 
subjunctively to our beliefs, we are learning to take epistemic distance and, at the 
same time, actively participating (being affectively involved, or simulating 
kinetically, or constructing mental imagery).  
 To the above list, we can surely also add (some) poetry. One of the sub-
abilities involved in the ability to take epistemic distance and participate is that of 
hesitating (which itself is a crucial dimension of the process of normative 
judgment). Experiencing poetry can improve our ability to hesitate. According to 
John Gibson, ‘Poetic meaning is experienced as latent, that is, there is frequently 
and importantly a felt gap between understanding the language of a poem and 
understanding the poem itself’ (2011, p. 4). If we take Gibson at his word, we can 
see how experience in reading poetry can help develop the ability to tolerate a gap 
between language and the construction of meaning, thereby exercising also the 
ability to hesitate (e.g. before attributing meaning to a word or phrase).  
 These are some of the general resources we can bring to bear,8 and there 
is (and I would argue should be) room for such literatures in a law school 
curriculum (or at least via extra-curricular reading clubs). Nevertheless, the real 
challenge in educating the imagination in a legal context is crafting activities that 
develop abilities to imagine that are not experienced from the beginning by law 
students as beyond or far removed from the legal world (as the above examples 
are likely to be experienced, rightly or wrongly). Here are three possible activities 
that seek to avoid foregrounding unfamiliar terrain, and instead invite students to 
perform unfamiliar activities on very – indeed, all too – familiar texts: 
 
- Translating Assertions into Tentative Statements: working in pairs or small 
groups, students are given 1) a text (excerpt from a judgement or a statute); 
and 2) a pack of cards, each containing some subjunctive term, e.g. 
‘perhaps’, or ‘maybe’. They are asked to attach these subjunctive terms to 
assertive statements they find in the text – whether at the beginning of a 
phrase, or in the middle, or at the end, or in substitution of a more assertive 
expression – in a way that they think may helpfully generate questions 
about the meaning of the assertive phrase. For example, Section 5(1) of the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (1999) says ‘A contractual 
term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair 
if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
                                                        
8 Another set of resources might be taken from the exercises articulated in Descartes’ 
Meditations – as Hatfield points out, these exercises are ‘means for suspending judgment’ 
(e.g. about corporeal things) (Hatfield 1986, p. 47). Descartes is often a bit of a villain in 
anti-foundational philosophies of knowledge and education, but if we think of his 
Meditations as exercises in being able to doubt actively (ever-extending our ability to 
doubt), then we might be able to draw on his work in constructing a pedagogy of 
imagination.  
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imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer.’ Students here might substitute ‘may 
perhaps’ for ‘shall’, or insert ‘maybe’ before ‘contrary to the requirement of 
good faith’, or add ‘perhaps’ between ‘it’ and ‘causes’. The pairs or groups 
then swap the amended texts, and consider how the alterations of the other 
pair or group affect the meaning of the text. Part of the point here is to 
encourage students to be more reflective about the language choices made 
by (in this case) the statutory draftspersons; but another is to assist 
students in reading a text subjunctively, i.e. considering actively where the 
language of a provision might be ambiguous (even if it doesn’t appear to be 
so at first, or without the assistance of any facts that make application of 
the language difficult).     
 
- Detaching Consequences from Operative Conditions: in a similarly 
structured exercise, students are given a text (e.g. a statutory provision), as 
well as scissors and writing material, and are asked to cut off consequential 
statements (the ‘then’ statements, in rules that take the form ‘If X, then Y’, 
and to either leave them hanging for another group to fill in, or paste in a 
different consequential term from another provision. In section 5(2) of the 
above Regulations, the consequence appears before the operative 
conditions (Y, if X): ‘A term shall always be regarded as not having been 
individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the 
consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the 
term.’ Students could here cut out the beginning of the sentence until and 
including ‘negotiated’, and ask another group to fill in the blank. 
Alternatively, the students could delete the operative conditions (‘drafted 
in advance...’ etc.), and ask students in another pair or group to supply their 
own. Again, the point here is to invite students to think actively about the 
choices being made, and also the difficulty in both choosing and drafting 
them. It is also to de-familiarise what may otherwise be all-too familiar 
texts that are read much too quickly, or memorised without any attempt at 
active engagement with their potential meaning.  
 
- Improvising Statutory Interpretation: in groups of about 6 students, take a 
statutory provision, set up an initial factual tableau (a set of facts that 
ostensibly corresponds to it – this may be taken form a case in which the 
statute was applied) and invite 4 students to act out the scenario. Students 
develop the scenario in some (typically unexpected and often humorous) 
direction. The other 2 students (as well as potentially the teacher) have 
‘Pause’ and ‘Go’ cards, and can thus stop the improvisation at a certain 
point and invite discussion as to whether the provision still applies or now 
wouldn’t apply to the scenario as improvised. There are all kinds of 
variations of this activity, including allowing one of the observing students 
to step in (at their choice of moment) and take over the role of one of the 
students in the scenario, or allow students to rewind the scenario and 
change it. I have done this in a workshop with students across all three 
years in our undergraduate degree on a provision of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977. The tableau that was set up (inspired in part by the facts 
in R&B Customs Brokers (1987)) was designed to explore the distinction 
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between ‘dealing as a consumer’ and ‘purchasing in the course of a 
business’, which are important concepts for that legislation. As the scenario 
was improvised, we paused at various times to consider which of the two 
categories applied most.  
 
Conducting such activities with one’s students takes considerable preparation 
time – the activities have to be well-structured and explained clearly to the 
students, and the teacher has to have had a sense of where they may develop and 
what points may be important to bring out (e.g. what issues may arise in the 
interpretation of the above provisions). However, there is also clearly an element 
of unpredictability in such exercises, and there has to be a joint commitment of 
both teachers and students to an atmosphere of exploration and play. These are, 
if you like, suggestions for what might be done in a Laboratory-Playground of 
Statutory Language, where both teachers and students take on a hybrid role of 
children in a playground and scientists in a laboratory. The physical elements of 
these activities are important: cutting up texts with scissors and improvising 
scenarios adds a strong kinetic and embodied dimensions to these exercises of 
imagination – this makes the exercises not only memorable, but also helps 
students to be more playful (more willing to take risks, and thus distance 
themselves from what they know and find familiar).   
 
 
3. Ability II: Generating Alternatives and Possibilities 
 
The above general ability to imagine is, as noted, emblematic of the model of 
imagination I have proposed. I have, therefore, spent more time on it than I shall 
with the next two. However, the next two abilities are also crucial, and of great 
value to anyone learning to think legally.  
 Once we are within the distinct epistemic frame of imagination (precisely 
by taking epistemic distance and participating in a variety of ways), we can then 
also exercise an ability to generate and multiply possibilities and alternatives 
within it. If one thinks of the general ability to imagine as one of holding or 
suspending, or bracketing or quarantining, then one can think of this ability as one 
of thinking sideways, horizontally, taking tangents and detours. One can generate 
possibilities and alternatives in a wide variety of ways, for example: 
 
- By maximising the past: constructing counterfactuals as to what would 
have happened if X had not happened, or if Y had happened;9 
 
- By maximising the future: constructing possible (or indeed impossible, 
improbable) future scenarios (or consequences of potential decisions); 
 
- By multiplying and shifting perspectives: constructing variations of points 
of view or character; 
 
                                                        
9 See on this topic now the new book by Catherine Gallagher (2017). A lot remains to be 
done on how counterfactual reasoning should be and might be developed in law schools.  
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- By reading subjunctively: reading for what was not said or not described, 
and for what might have been said instead or differently. This will 
sometimes involve rescuing irrelevancies, zooming in and out of facts (as 
described), or changing and adding characters.  
 
All these ways of generating possibilities and alternatives have important 
analogues in legal reasoning, for instance: 
 
- In attributing causality and responsibility, we often rely on conventions of 
what is likely and normal, but these can often be mistaken or conceal biases 
– multiplying counterfactual scenarios can help make those attributions 
more careful; 
 
- Decisions about what may be normatively relevant (what interests and 
values may be at stake in cases of this kind) often depend on hypothetical 
scenarios (in which we imagine, say, the consequences of a prospective 
norm being enacted) – becoming better at imagining variations of such 
hypothetical scenarios can help improve those judgements of relevance; 
 
- An important aspect of legal reasoning involves imagining the attributes, 
actions and attitudes of imaginary figures (e.g. reasonable persons, 
officious bystanders, right-thinking members of society). Being able to 
imagine variations of a perspective can help in the search for relevant 
normative differences; and 
 
- When casting about for possibly relevant precedents, and thus also 
analogies, one needs to read those past cases actively, i.e. to simultaneously 
reconstruct the facts of the past case and the present case (thereby 
connecting or indeed disconnecting, rather than simply applying, the past 
with the present). Reading actively, as noted above, involves reading for 
what is not said or what could have been said differently – e.g. for what 
facts might be or might have been thought to be relevant. This kind of 
reading (which generates possibilities and alternatives) can help with the 
ability to re-characterise the facts of a past case (for instance, at a higher 
level of generality), thereby either making it more or less similar to the 
facts of the present case.  
 
Here are three activities one might engage in a legal context to develop this ability 
to generate alternatives and possibilities: 
 
- Variations of Utopia: Students form small groups, and each group is tasked 
with constructing a utopia – either a utopia with law (so an ideal legal 
utopia) or a utopia without law (so a utopia where law is not needed). They 
are required to give a name to their utopia, and to imagine it as concretely 
as they can (including its geography, and any other features of what life is 
like there). They are then asked to choose one member of their team as an 
ambassador, who travels away from their utopia to a meeting of all such 
ambassadors, and describes what life is like in their utopia. Each 
ambassador, from each group, does so, and we then compare and contrast 
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the utopias constructed. I have tried this in my Jurisprudence and Legal 
Theory classes, and this was a fun and successful activity. It brought to light 
many (different and contestable) assumptions the students operated 
under as to what were the functions and benefits of law.  
 
- Variations of Figuration: students are given a case involving the reasonable 
person to read prior to the class. When I have tried this in the past, I have 
done so with the famous case of Vaughan v Menlove (1837). Working in 
small groups initially, and then comparing the results across groups in a 
large group discussion, students imagine variations of the Reasonable 
Person, i.e. they are asked to describe what would have done by 1) the 
Extremely Reasonable Person; 2) the Very Reasonable Person; 3) the 
Extremely Unreasonable Person; and 4) the Very Unreasonable Person. 
Again, this has always been a fun activity to engage in – especially when 
thinking about the extremes (of the extremely reasonable or 
unreasonable). This exercise is designed to assist both with the ability to 
imagine counterfactual scenarios, as well as to imagine variations on 
perspectives and shift between them.   
 
- Reading Cases Actively: Nietzsche once said that to read well is to ‘read 
slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with 
doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers’ (quoted in Boulous-Walker, 
2017, p. 24). In that spirit, students may be given a variety of activities that 
invite them to read actively, generating possibilities and alternatives as 
they go. Students are given a case to read before a workshop, and in the 
workshop are given various activities that give them opportunities to 
imagine the facts of the case in greater detail than is described, or to 
introduce new facts. These activities can involve giving the students props 
(including photographs relating to things mentioned but not described in 
detail in the case), or asking them to re-characterise a character named in 
the case (by imagining their back-story or giving them a name where have 
none, etc.) or by inviting them to introduce a character. I do not describe 
these activities here in more detail, as I have done so elsewhere (see Del 
Mar 2016).  
 
 
4. Ability III: Constructing Mental Imagery  
 
Let me turn now to the final ability: constructing mental imagery. For some 
philosophers, constructing mental imagery is synonymous with exercising the 
imagination – as noted above, some philosophers do not regard supposing as an 
exercise of the imagination, and this is because supposing does not (or is said not 
to) involve constructing mental imagery (see Balcerak-Jackson 2016). In the 
model I have proposed, constructing mental imagery is one of the ways in which 
we exercise the imagination (another way is, indeed, supposing without 
constructing mental imagery). It helps to think of the imagination in this more 
gregarious way, for it helps us see the spectrum of cognitive, affective, kinetic and 
sensory abilities that exercises of the imagination can involve.  
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 In his ever-inspirational lectures (Six Memos for the Millennium, 1988), 
which he never got a chance to deliver (as he died before completing them), Italo 
Calvino wrote with his characteristic mix of clarity and lyricism about the value of 
‘visibility’:  
 
If I have included visibility in my list of values to be saved, it is to give 
warning of the danger we run in losing a basic human faculty: the power of 
bringing visions into focus with our eyes shut, of bringing forth forms and 
colours from the lines of black letters on a white page, and in fact of 
thinking in terms of images. I have in mind some possible pedagogy of the 
imagination that would accustom us to control our own inner vision 
without suffocating it or letting it fall, on the other hand, into confused, 
ephemeral daydreams, but would enable the images to crystallise into a 
well-defined, memorable, and self-sufficient form, the icastic form. 
(Calvino 1988, p. 92) 
 
One could argue that some of Calvino’s own works offer the best kind of pedagogy 
of the imagination (for instance, Invisible Cities: see Modena 2011), at least when 
understood as training in ‘bringing forth forms and colours’ from text.10 Calvino 
himself said we could do worse than look to St Ignatius of Loyola and his Spiritual 
Exercises (1522-1524). In these exercises, as Calvino put it, ‘The believer is called 
upon personally to paint frescoes crowded with figures on the walls of his mind’ 
(Calvino 1988, p. 86). Famously, the exercises required the student to visualise a 
place, e.g. ‘a temple, a mountain, a value of teats, the Virgin’s chamber, a warrior 
camp, a garden’, and in ‘painstaking’ detail: ‘consider the length of the road, its 
width, if it passes through a plain or across valleys and hills’ (Barthes 1976, p. 55). 
‘The visual composition of place’ was, however, only one element. Others were 
that the exercises were multisensory, and involved the embodied and situated self. 
In other words, the student was asked to construct mental imagery of the details 
of a place, and simulate how it might have been experienced by the people who 
found themselves in it, as well as how he himself would have felt if (say) walking 
through it. Thus, for instance, ‘imagining of Hell consists in perceiving it five 
consecutive times in the mode of each of the five senses: seeing the incandescent 
bodies, hearing the screams of the damned, smelling the stink of the abyss, tasting 
the bitterness of tears, touching the fire’ (Barthes 1976, p. 59). Constructing 
mental imagery, then, does not stand apart from, but instead works intimately in 
tandem with, kinetic and affective involvement.  
                                                        
10 Out of his own texts, Calvino in the context discussed The Castle of Crossed Destinies, 
though this points to an exercise the other way around, i.e. beginning with images, and 
generating text (words, stories) from those images. As Calvino explains, when he was a 
young boy (between the ages of 3 and 6), and before he learnt to read, he ‘read’ comic 
strips (Happy Hooligan, Felix the Cat): ‘In my mind, I told myself the stories, interpreting 
the scenes in different ways – I produced variants, put together the single episodes into a 
story of broader scope, thought and isolated and then connected the recurring elements 
in each series, mixing up one series with another, and invented new series in which the 
secondary characters became protagonists’ (Calvino 1988, p. 93). This was, he said, ‘a 
schooling in fable-making, stylisation, in the composition of the image’ (Calvino 1988, p. 
94). The use of text-less visual imagery as a mode of legal education remains 
underexplored.  
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 The pedagogical role of constructing mental imagery, and its link with 
kinesis and affectivity, was recognised by Kieran Egan, in his Imagination in 
Teaching and Learning (1992). Egan spoke of the power of learning through 
‘affective images’ – of acquiring knowledge by constructing mental imagery, but 
imagery in which we simulate ourselves feeling: 
 
If we study earthworms, we will do well to feel ourselves slither and push, 
tentatively exploring a direction looking for softer passages through the 
soil, contracting and expanding our rippling muscles in the direction of 
scents, moisture, grubs. That is, as we learn about the anatomy of an 
earthworm we have to feel our way into that anatomy, to feel how the 
world would feel and taste and smell with that anatomy. If we study trees, 
we similarly evoke images and sensations, waking and opening to the 
spring sun, the throbbing sap, the ecstasy of flower and fruit, the slowing 
cold and curling back into our sleeping barky shell for winter (Egan 1992, 
p. 118) 
 
One might object that this may work for the natural world, but is unlikely to work 
when studying the social world, or the conceptual structure of some abstract 
concept. Egan very much disagrees, and offers a striking ‘affective image’ of the 
concept of democratic government as a ‘well-meaning but unstable giant’: 
 
...so that seething mass of conflicting hopes and ambitions, which seems in 
constant danger of falling into chaos, manages somehow to stagger 
forward, helping people to live the lives they want... the image of a well-
meaning but unstable giant, carrying a population on a huge tray, 
contoured and shaped like the country, constantly stumbling and zig-
zagging, trying to follow the directions given by the people being carried. 
The giant has to struggle over treacherous terrain – buffeted, abused, 
despised – yet persisting. The people on the tray ignore him, getting on 
with their lives, but occasionally shout for him to turn right, or left, or go 
back, or leap forward. Much of his stumbling is due to trying to follow all 
these directions at once. And yet the giant keeps going, more or less 
forward, and manages to stay upright, and keep the country more or less 
on an even keel... (Egan 1992, p. 137) 
 
Constructing imagery in this way can of course be deployed by the teacher in 
explaining some complex phenomenon – in the above case, describing the 
dynamics over time of government processes, and their constant relative 
instability. They can also be a process of learning, i.e. the very experience of 
constructing them in a way that makes emotional and kinetic sense (we can 
simulate the movements of the giant, and thus understand the dynamics of 
government in a certain way) can be a wonderful way of exploring the complexity 
of a concept.  
 Bearing the above in mind, here are three possible exercises for law 
students, designed to develop the ability to construct mental imagery: 
 
- Collective Listening to the Oral Reading of a Case: students in small groups 
lie on the floor with their eyes closed, while the teacher or (better) another 
 16
student reads a portion of a case (in particular, its facts). Part of this 
exercise may involve the students on the floor echoing words they seem 
significant, but it would mainly involve the students trying to visualise the 
facts. Having done so, the students are put into pairs to share experiences 
of what they visualised, followed by a general discussion of the similarities 
and differences in the processing of fact descriptions.  
 
- Storyboarding a Case: before the class, students are given a case or a 
portion of a case to read. Then, in small groups or pairs, students are asked 
to storyboard those facts into text-less images – into a comic strip. Students 
need not actually draw the images, but instead describe what would be in 
them – of course, if the students were keen, one could attempt some actual 
storyboarding (or one could try this by pairing a law student with a visual 
artist). The class then discusses the difficulties of storyboarding in this way 
– for instance, what facts had to be imagined in some specific detail that 
need not be so described in language. This exercise offers an opportunity 
not only to train the construction of mental imagery, but also to explore the 
ambiguities of language (and specifically fact description in cases).11  
 
- Emblematic Law: in small groups or in pairs, students are asked to 
construct an imaginary emblem of Law (as in the nature of law), or some 
area of the law, or some concept of the law. Constructing an emblem 
involves coming up with a figure (e.g. as in the figure of justice), in a certain 
setting and with certain props (on the tradition of legal emblems: see 
Goodrich 2013). In this version, students do not draw an actual emblem 
(though this too may be done, if the students are keen), but instead imagine 
one. After the initial exercise, the class has a general discussion as to how 
different groups or pairs imagined the emblem. This could be done not only 
in legal theory classes, but also in classes on particular concepts of law (e.g. 
consideration or promissory estoppel in contract law).  
 
As noted above, lawyers and judges need to construct mental imagery often in the 
exercise of the imagination in legal reasoning. They do so when they deploy 
metaphor, propose and offer variations or counter-examples to hypothetical 
scenarios, and when simulating imaginary figures (like the Reasonable Person). 
Exercises for constructing mental imagery in law students, then, are much called 
for – especially in environments that are fun rather than stressful (Socratic-like 
debates over hypotheticals in a lecture or seminar are often stressful rather than 





The emphasis of the above argument for the role of the imagination has been an 
epistemological one: imagination plays an important and under-estimated role in 
                                                        
11 For further discussion and some related exercises (especially in the context of reading 
past cases), which also draw on differences between visual and linguistic expression, see 
Del Mar (2016).  
 17
legal reasoning by enabling and sustaining an inquiry into normative relevance, 
i.e. into what values and interests may be at stake in a particular case and in cases 
of that kind. Artefacts like metaphors, hypothetical scenarios and figuration are 
valuable for individual lawyers and judges, for scenes of interaction in courtrooms 
and for the resourcefulness of legal language over time. Given the imagination’s 
epistemological importance, we should – or so I have argued – look for ways that 
we can encourage its development in law students. I have, in that spirit, described 
a number of more or less closely law-related resources and activities.  
 In addition, however, to the epistemological arguments are also the moral 
and political ones. In his series of lectures on The Educated Imagination, Northrop 
Frye argued that ‘what produces...tolerance is the power of detachment in the 
imagination, where things are removed just out of reach of belief and action’ (Frye 
1964, p. 56). Conceiving of the imagination in this way – as ‘the power of 
detachment’ from belief and action – Frye writes passionately about the relation 
between tolerance and listening to and being able to follow stories (making 
affective sense of them), and more generally of the moral and political importance 
of being ‘flexible’ in ‘our manipulation of possibilities’. Others, too, have defended 
the moral and political importance of the imagination based on seeing it as a mode 
of the suspension of disbelief. My approach here is different (though not 
altogether so): rather than foregrounding detachment, I have spoken of a more 
liminal state, both attached and detached at the same time. If this is detachment, 
it is a very immersive or participatory one – but it is probably better conceived as 
a kind of reflexive enchantment; a fictional rather than fantastical mode. 
Imagination understood this way certainly has moral and political importance – 
notably in how it can help us develop respect for difference and the otherness of 
others, but not from a safe vantage point or as an observer, but as a participant 
who experiences their own limitations. In that sense, exercising the imagination 
can help us find wonder and responsibility in our epistemic finitude. That, 
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